Introduction
A theoretical perspective that has contributed significantly to modern financial theory is that of agency theory, which considers a business enterprise from the viewpoint of the various stakeholders it might have, and explores how their financial interests are furthered and protected in their dealings with each other. The stakeholder relationships that receive most attention in the small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) literature are those between:
• Managers and owners.
• Owner-managers and other owners.
• Insiders (primarily owner-managers, other owners and managers) and outsiders (mainly creditors and lenders).
The central dilemma in agency theory is that day-to-day control of an SME's activities and financial fortunes very often rests in the hands of only some stakeholders who are usually managers or owner-managers. Yet all stakeholders have a legitimate expectation that their interests will be well served. By analogy with legal notions of agent and principal, those who exercise control are seen as being agents for the other stakeholders who are considered to be principals.
The most significant problems that may arise from agency relationships in SMEs are:
• Information asymmetry.
• Moral hazard.
• Adverse selection.
• Residual loss.
One rational response to the inherent risk posed by self-interest on the part of agents, and other behaviours detrimental to principals in agency relationships, is for each stakeholder to increase the reward expected in return for participation in the business. Other possible responses are of two broad types:
• Monitoring.
• Bonding.
An important point about these responses to agency-related risk is that they are not costless.
The out-of-pocket costs of maintaining an agency relationship may therefore include higher costs of financing, costs entailed in overcoming information asymmetries to achieve better monitoring of agents' activities, transaction costs incurred in setting up formal contractual arrangements with agents, and costs of incentive payments to agents. There are, in addition, less evident agency costs such as excessive perquisite consumption and shirking by agents, and also the opportunity costs arising from non-optimal financial decisions made by agents.
Agency costs in total are the incremental costs explicitly and implicitly incurred over those that would be experienced in a perfect capital market situation, and typically they must ultimately be borne by the owners of the businesses concerned. Against these costs the owners must weigh the perceived benefits of agency relationships such as access to finance and management expertise they do not themselves possess.
As a remedy to agency problems, bonding involves devising means by which congruence between the goals of agents and those of principals may be promoted. One approach is to use contracts which formally bind the parties to agreed types of behaviour, and which provide for sanctions should actual behaviour deviate from that specified in the contract. Another means of bonding agents and principals is through incentive schemes which encourage mutually acceptable behaviour without requiring it and without explicit sanctions. The possibility of failing to realise the benefits specified in the incentive scheme provides the motivation for the desired behaviour. Goal congruence may also be encouraged by adopting certain management practices that must be employed such as strategic and operational planning. Finally, goal congruence between agents and principals may be achieved by merging ownership and control so that managers are also at least part owners of the business. The idea is that if managers are also owners they are unlikely to knowingly undertake actions that are financially detrimental to owners. If this is the case, it is anticipated that the performance of a business with a high coincidence of ownership and control will exceed that of a business with some degree of separation of ownership and control. As will be seen, whether or not this expectation is realised has been the subject of extensive research (Dalton et al., 2003; Sundaramurthy et al., 2005) . In the main, this research effort has been concerned with larger businesses and very little has focused on SMEs.
The principal objective in this paper is to examine in some depth the relationships between ownership structure, business growth and financial performance amongst SMEs with different degrees of overlap between management and ownership. This is made possible by the recent availability of data from the Australian federal government's Business Longitudinal Survey (BLS). The paper proceeds as follows. After reviewing prior research on the relationship between ownership structure and performance, the current research method is outlined. Thereafter, the findings of the research are presented, followed by conclusions arising from this investigation.
Prior Research

Research On Large Businesses
The proposition that goal congruence between agents and principals may be achieved by merging ownership and control so that managers are also at least part owners of the business is referred to as the alignment effect by Dalton et al. (2003) and Sundaramurthy et al. (2005) . Himmelberg et al. (1999, p. 354 ) describe this conjectured effect as follows:
. . . it is well known that a potential solution to the fundamental agency problem is to provide managers with equity stakes in their firms. Thus, managerial self-interest may be mitigated by aligning the interests of managers and shareholders, and it is presumed firm performance will improve as managers concurrently work for their own and shareholders' benefit.
Hence, the alignment effect suggests a positive relationship between the extent of ownermanagership of a business and its performance. Performance in this context may be viewed in terms of business growth and/or financial performance. Justification for considering business growth in this context is provided by Brush et al. (2000, p. 455 ) who point out that:
According to agency theory, managers pursue growth because growth benefits them personally -growth guarantees employment and salary increases for managers due to the greater responsibility of managing a larger firm.
A further influence upon the relationship between owner-managership and performance is referred to as the entrenchment effect by Sundaramurthy et al. (2005) . Acknowledging the initial positive benefit of the alignment effect, it is argued that when the proportion of ownership held by managers reaches higher levels they have sufficient control to entrench their positions regardless of performance. Sundaramurthy et al. (2005, p. 496) indicate that:
Two interrelated arguments support the notion of entrenchment effects. Given that managers have already invested their non-diversifiable human capital in the firm, increased share ownership transfers additional risk to managers who are relatively risk averse. This additional risk can lead to risk-reducing behavior that is against stockholders' interests. Second, substantial executive stock ownership can give managers control over their dismissal.
Hence, the entrenchment effect suggests a negative relationship between the extent of ownermanagership of a business and its performance. Sundaramurthy et al. (2005) indicate that there is no consensus amongst researchers in the area regarding the level of ownermanagership at which the entrenchment effect ultimately outweighs the alignment effect.
Comprehensive empirical evidence on potential relationships between the extent of managerial ownership and business performance is provided by recent meta-analyses of prior research conducted by Dalton et al. (2003) and by Sundaramurthy et al. (2005) . Dalton et al. (2003, p. 16) 
point out that:
Meta-analysis is a statistical technique for research synthesis that, while correcting for various statistical artefacts, allows the aggregation of results across separate studies and yields an estimate of the true relationship between two variables in a population.
The Dalton et al. (2003) and Sundaramurthy et al. (2005) meta-analyses were primarily motivated by the lack of consensus emerging from empirical research in the field. Dalton et al. (2003) found 229 empirical studies yielding 1,880 usable samples for a combined sample of n=939,567. Sundaramurthy et al. (2005) were able to identify 43 studies containing 97 usable samples representing a combined sample of n=33,892. The reason the number of usable samples exceeds the number of studies in these two meta-analyses is that some studies use multiple measures of managerial ownership and/or multiple measures of performance.
Reflecting the alignment effect, Dalton et al. (2003, p. 15) test the hypothesis that for large public corporations 'Insider equity holdings will be positively associated with financial performance'. Ownership structure is measured (inter alia) as the proportion of equity held by the chief executive officer and by management generally. The financial performance measures used include return on assets, return on equity and return on sales. With one minor exception, Dalton et al. (2003, p. 19) find that 'in no instance did an estimated population correlation between measurements of internal equity and financial performance exceed .018 in variance explained'. Dalton et al. (2003) go on to conclude that their meta-analysis does not support agency theory's proposed relationship between ownership structure and financial performance.
Reflecting both the alignment effect and the entrenchment effect, Sundaramurthy et al. (2005, p.497) test the hypothesis that for large public corporations 'At lower levels of executive ownership, there is a positive relationship between executive ownership and firm performance; at higher levels of executive ownership, there is a negative relationship'.
Ownership structure is measured as the proportion of equity held by the chief executive officer and by management generally. The relationship between ownership structure and sales growth is examined. The financial performance measures used include return on assets, return on equity and return on sales. Overall, Sundaramurthy et al. (2005) find a corrected mean correlation of -0.001 which is very small. Sundaramurthy et al. (2005, p.495) subsequently conclude that 'our results indicate that there is no substantive relationship between ownership and performance' and that 'These findings are robust even after the potential influence of moderator variables . . . is considered'.
Research On SMEs
A thorough literature search has discovered far fewer research studies examining the relationships between ownership structure, business growth and financial performance amongst smaller businesses. Yet, a case can be made that SMEs provide a better environment than their larger counterparts in which to study possible relationships between ownership structure and financial performance. For example, Daily and Dollinger (1992, pp. 117-118) point out that:
. . . the small firm, particularly the family-owned and -managed business, is more likely to have a single individual -the owner-operator -who can accurately assess firm processes. Those firms, therefore, provide a rich area for investigating hypotheses about the separation of ownership and control. It is in the smaller firm that linkages between ownership and performance may be more easily observed.
Daily and Dollinger (1992) investigate (inter alia) the relationship between ownership structure and sales growth amongst 186 manufacturing SMEs in the United States. The businesses in the study are classified as either family owned and managed or as professionally managed concerns (that is, managers with no ownership stake). A univariate test reveals no statistically significant difference in sales growth between the two groups.
Daily and Thompson (1994) examine (inter alia) the relationship between ownership structure and sales growth amongst 108 heating and air conditioning wholesalers in the United States. The sample businesses are classified as family firms, entrepreneurial firms, owner/manager firms or professionally managed firms. Multiple regression analysis fails to discover a statistically significant relationship between ownership structure and sales growth amongst the SMEs studied.
Daily and Dalton (1992) study (inter alia) the relationships between ownership structure and return on assets and return on owners equity amongst 186 publicly traded SMEs in the United States. The businesses in the study are classified as being managed by their founder (holding most or all of the equity) or as being professionally managed. Multivariate analysis of variance reveals a statistically significant relationship between ownership structure and return on assets, but not for return on owners equity. Randoy and Goel (2003) use data on 86 publicly traded SMEs in Norway to examine the relationship between ownership structure, measured as the percentage of equity held by insiders, and financial performance measured as (inter alia) return on assets. Using multiple regression, it is found that higher inside ownership is statistically related to higher return on assets when the business continues to be managed by the founding family. Where the founding family is not in control, higher inside ownership is statistically related to lower return on assets.
O' Regan et al. (2005) examine the relationship between ownership structure and financial performance, measured as gross profit per employee per annum, in a sample of 207 electronics and engineering firms in the United Kingdom. The businesses in the study are classified as being owner-managed or as being professionally managed. Univariate testing reveals that owner-managed concerns tend to outperform professional managed SMEs.
In view of the findings for larger businesses and the equivocal findings for SMEs outlined above, it is considered appropriate to word the hypotheses for testing in the present study in the null form as follows:
There is no statistically significant relationship between the proportion of equity held by SME managers and achieved business growth in the businesses examined.
H 0B : There is no statistically significant relationship between the proportion of equity held by SME managers and achieved financial performance in the businesses examined.
Research Method
The panel data employed in this research are drawn from the Business Longitudinal Survey Furthermore, because a key question requesting information on the proportion of an SME's equity that is held by owner-managers was not asked in the 1994-95 survey, the analysis presented in this paper is confined to panel data for the 1995-96, 1996-97 and 1997-98 financial years only.
Variables used in this research are either categorical in nature or, if metric, have irregular distributional properties (that is, they are non-normally distributed). Transformation of metric variables to produce normal distributions is avoided because of difficulties of interpretation often created by such procedures. Thus, non-parametric/distribution free techniques of statistical analysis are employed exclusively.
Research Findings
Ownership Structure
For each year of the study, SMEs in the BLS panel are allocated to one of four ownership structures as follows:
• Owner-managers hold 100 per cent of the equity, and so exercise complete control of their businesses. Necessarily, there are no non-managing owners.
• Owner-managers hold greater than 50 per cent and less than 100 per cent of the equity, and so exercise majority control of their businesses. This situation introduces the possibility of agency contests between owner-managers and minority non-managing owners.
• Owner-managers hold less than or equal to 50 per cent and more than 0 per cent of the equity, and so exercise minority control of their businesses. Again there is the possibility of agency contests between owner-managers and non-managing owners, with the latter holding the majority of the equity with commensurate influence.
• There are no owner-managers, so that the business is professionally managed by individuals with no share in equity. Here there is the possibility of agency contests between professional managers and non-managing owners, with the latter holding all of the equity with commensurate influence. Table 1 indicates the proportions of businesses falling into each of the ownership structures for each year in the study. Around two-thirds of the businesses have owner-managers who exercise complete control, thus representing the most common circumstance associated with SMEs.
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
In the logistic regression modelling of business growth and financial performance to follow, the key independent variable is ownership structure with customary controls for enterprise size, enterprise age, industry, and financial leverage (for return on owners equity only). It is therefore helpful to assess the variability of the control variables across ownership structures. Table 2 shows how enterprise size measured in terms of employment, sales and assets varies across ownership structures. SMEs with owner-managers who exercise complete control are clearly smaller than the remainder in terms of employment, sales and assets.
Furthermore, businesses with no owner-managers (that is, are professionally managed) are significantly larger than the remainder in terms of employment, sales and assets.
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE Table 3 shows how enterprise age varies across ownership structures. SMEs with owner-managers who exercise complete control appear to be younger than the remainder which tend to be around the same age.
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
To conserve space, cross-tabulations of ownership structure (four categories) against industry (eleven categories) for each year of the study are not presented. Inspection of such cross-tabulations does suggest differences in industry representation amongst the various ownership structures. However, it is not possible to judge the statistical significance of these differences because Chi-Square tests are hampered by sparse cells. Table 4 shows how financial leverage varies across ownership structures. SMEs with owner-managers who exercise complete control are clearly the most highly geared with around 70 per cent or more debt financing. Furthermore, businesses with no owner-managers (that is, are professionally managed) have significantly lower gearing than the remainder using around 55 per cent debt financing.
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
Overall then, the findings presented thus far suggest that smaller and younger SMEs in the BLS panel have less complex ownership structures and are therefore likely to experience lower equity agency costs. However, because of their more extensive use of debt financing, they are likely to experience greater debt-related agency costs. This latter finding is significant since Ang et al. (2000) have found that external monitoring by lenders produces a limited positive externality in the form of somewhat lower equity agency costs.
Business Growth
This section of the paper examines the results of logistic regression modelling of business growth with ownership structure as the key independent variable and with controls for enterprise size (measured as employment), enterprise age and industry. Specifically, for each year of the study and for each of employment growth, sales growth and asset growth, a logistic regression model is developed with the dependent variable being whether or not the growth measure concerned falls below or above the median value for that growth measure.
The results of the modelling are presented in Tables 5, 6 and 7. INSERT TABLES 5, 6, AND 7 ABOUT HERE Inspection of the logistic regression coefficients for ownership structure in Tables 5, 6 and 7 reveals that none are consistently significant across all three years of the study. The closest are for employment growth for which the ownership structure coefficients of SMEs with no owner-managers (that is, professionally managed concerns) are significant and negative in two of three years. Overall though, the data reveal that there are no consistent, statistically significant differences in employment growth, sales growth and asset growth across ownership structures.
Financial Performance
This section of the paper examines the results of logistic regression modelling of financial performance with ownership structure as the key independent variable and with controls for enterprise size (measured as employment), enterprise age, industry and financial leverage (for return on owners equity only). Specifically, for each year of the study and for each of return on owners equity, return on total assets, net return on sales and asset turnover, a logistic regression model is developed with the dependent variable being whether or not the financial performance measure concerned falls below or above the median value for that performance measure. The results of the modelling are presented in Tables 8, 9 , 10 and 11.
INSERT TABLES 8, 9, 10 AND 11 ABOUT HERE Inspection of the logistic regression coefficients for ownership structure in Tables 8, 9 and 10 reveals that none are consistently significant across all three years of the study.
Overall then, the data reveal that there are no consistent, statistically significant differences in return on owners equity, return on total assets and net return on sales across ownership structures.
Inspection of the logistic regression coefficients for ownership structure in Table 11 addressing asset turnover reveals consistently significant coefficients over three years for SMEs having owner-managers who exercise complete control (that is, hold 100% equity) and for SMEs with no owner-managers (that is, professionally managed concerns). The signs of the coefficients suggest that SMEs having owner-managers who exercise complete control are more likely to be above the median for asset turnover, while those with no ownermanagers are more likely to be below the median for asset turnover. Table 12 shows how asset turnover varies across ownership structures. SMEs with owner-managers who exercise complete control clearly have the highest asset turnover, and those with no owner-managers have significantly lower asset turnover than the remainder.
INSERT TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE These differences in asset turnover could reflect differential performance in terms of asset utilisation and/or differences in capital intensity. To check on the latter reason, Table 13 shows how asset structure (that is, non-current assets as a percentage of total assets) varies across ownership structures. The data reveal that over the three years of the study there are no consistent, statistically significant differences in asset structure across ownership structures, implying the existence of differential performance in terms of asset utilisation.
INSERT TABLE 13 ABOUT HERE
Summary and Conclusions
The key findings from this research into ownership structure, business growth and financial performance amongst Australian SMEs included in the BLS CURF panel can be summarised as follows:
• On the basis of this study, it is not possible the reject the null hypothesis H 0A that there is no statistically significant relationship between the proportion of equity held by SME managers and achieved business growth in the businesses examined.
• On the basis of this study, it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis H 0B that there is no statistically significant relationship between the proportion of equity held by SME managers and achieved financial performance in the businesses examined as measured by return on owners equity, return on total assets and net return on sales. While it is possible to reject H 0B for asset turnover ratio, the effect is not strong enough to flow through to return on total assets and then to return on owners equity.
It is important to recognise that seemingly negative findings like those above have their role to play in the advancement of knowledge. Aldrich (1992, p. 208) 
points out that:
Entrepreneurship research resembles many other social sciences in the way that it systematically disdains two processes central to normal scientific endeavour: 1) attempted replication and confirmation of previous findings; and 2) publication of negative findings. Instead, we are treated to 'new' concepts and 'positive' findings, as authors try to differentiate their products from their potential competitors. Presently, we have persons calling themselves theorists who need not take seriously the stream of contradictory research findings pouring out of various research programs.
The present study has attempted to replicate prior research conducted on large businesses with a sample of smaller concerns. It is a more thorough examination of the relationships between ownership structure, business growth and financial performance than can be found in the extant SME research literature. Ultimately, the findings do not differ from those emanating from larger business research. This is a worthwhile outcome to have, especially because (inter alia) it seriously challenges the relevance of agency theory in its application to smaller businesses.
Beyond the inevitable bounds introduced to this research study by the broad data and methodological choices made, an important limitation to the analysis presented is that only linear relationships between ownership structure, business growth and financial performance have been sought. Furthermore, the presumed direction of causality has been from ownership structure (as the independent variable) to business growth or financial performance (as dependent variables). The underlying assumption has been made that ownership structure is exogenously rather than endogenously determined.
After commenting on the relatively few studies that have examined non-monotonic relationships, Dalton et al. (2003, p. 21) express the opinion that 'Consideration of the potential for nonlinear relationships in the ownership-performance area may be . . . fruitful'.
Of course, in their meta-analysis Sundaramurthy et al. (2005) anticipated this development by examining an hypothesis embodying an alignment effect followed by an entrenchment effect at higher levels of managerial ownership. More recent studies not covered by the Dalton et al. (2003) and Sundaramurthy et al. (2005) meta-analyses have pursued this line of inquiry. For example, Ng (2005) examines large family controlled listed corporations in Hong Kong and finds a cubic relationship between ownership structure and return on owners equity. This posits an entrenchment effect followed by an alignment effect followed by another entrenchment effect. Ng (2005) also finds evidence that ownership structure is exogenously determined and that the direction of causation is from ownership structure to financial performance. Clearly, a useful extension to the present study would be to employ non-linear statistical methods to see if Ng's (2005) findings can be replicated in an SME sample. Owner-manager(s) with > 50% and < 100% equity 
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